[mdx] Joe on 3.1.1

[Ian Young]

On 27 Sep 2013, at 15:36, "Cantor, Scott" <cantor.2 at osu.edu> wrote:

> On 9/27/13 10:24 AM, "Ian Young" <ian at iay.org.uk> wrote:
> 
>> If the fake IdP resolves the original artifact into an assertion (which
>> is going to be signed by the entity in the metadata the SP has just got)
>> then I was thinking there might be a possible route to an attack based on
>> the contents of that metadata. For example, the SP would believe a Scope
>> element if it appeared there. However, the assumption would be that the
>> rogue entity had its metadata introduced by some registrar somewhere, so
>> that shouldn't be a real problem.
> 
> If you start with the premise that the metadata itself is at risk, then
> you obviously have many attacks possible, so that doesn't lead to any
> useful places.

Indeed.  And in this case, I guess you don't get anything over and above just sending an unsolicited artifact to the SP yourself, other than the potential denial of service.

>> Just for interest, was that ever explicitly discussed in the SAML TC when
>> the SAML 2.0 artifact format was invented?
> 
> The hashing notion dates back to 1.0, and no, I'm sure that like most
> standards, use of hashing is just treated as "magic".

Is the same use case there in SAML 1.x artifact flows, then?  Just so that I know whether to say SAML or SAML 2.0 when describing it.

	-- Ian



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